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Abstract
Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls
to behave differently. Price controls – in the form of taxes – ﬁx the marginal cost of compliance
and lead to uncertain levels of compliance. Meanwhile quantity controls – in the form of tradable
permits or quotas – ﬁx the level of compliance but result in uncertain marginal costs. This fun-
damental difference in the face of cost uncertainty leads to different welfare outcomes for the two
policy instruments. Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) clariﬁed this point and derived theoretical
conditions under which one policy is preferred to the other.
This paper applies this principal to the issue of worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) control,
using a global integrated climate economy model to simulate the consequences of uncertainty and
to compare the efﬁciency of taxes and permits empirically. The results indicate that an optimal
tax policy generates gains which are ﬁve times higher than the optimal permit policy – a $337
billion dollar gain versus $69 billion at the global level. This result follows from Weitzman’s
original intuition that relatively ﬂat marginal beneﬁts/damages favor taxes, a feature that drops out
of standard assumptions about the nature of climate damages.
A hybrid policy, suggested by Roberts and Spence (1976), is also explored. Such a policy uses
an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a target emission level, but then allows additional
permits to be purchased at a ﬁxed “trigger” price. The optimal hybrid policy leads to welfare
beneﬁts only slightly higher than the optimal tax policy. Relative to the tax policy, however, the
hybridpreserves the ability to ﬂexibly distributethe rentsassociated with theright to emit. Perhaps
more importantly for policy discussions, a sub-optimal hybrid policy, based on a stringent target
and high trigger price (e.g., 1990 emissions and a $100/tC trigger), generates much better welfare
outcomes than a straight permit system with the same target. Both of these features suggest that a
hybrid policy is a more attractive alternative to either a straight tax or permit system.
Key words: Climate Change, Policy Under Uncertainty, Price and Quantity Controls, General
Equilibrium Modeling
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Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) drew attention to the fact that, in regulated markets, uncer-
tainty about costs leads to a potentially important efﬁciency distinction between otherwise equiva-
lent price and quantity controls. Despite this well-known observation and its relevance for climate
change policy, most of the debate concerning the use of taxes and emission permits to control
greenhouse gases (GHGs) has centered on political, legal and revenue concerns. This paper re-
sponds to this important omission by examining the efﬁciency properties of permit and tax policies
to reduce global warming.
The basic distinction among policy instruments arises because taxes ﬁx the marginal cost of
abatementat thespeciﬁed taxlevel (assumingoptimalﬁrmbehavior). Withuncertaintyaboutcosts,
this generates a range of possible abatement levels and emission outcomes. In constrast, a permit
system precisely limits emissions but leads to a range of potential cost outcomes. When coupled
with a model of the beneﬁts associated with emission reduction, this divergence in emission and
cost outcomes creates a distinction in the expected welfare associated with each policy.
In the case of climate change, part of the cost uncertainty arises due to uncertainty about the
level of future baseline emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1992) gives
a range of CO2 emission levels in 2025 of between 8.8 and 15.1 GtC.
2 The cost of attaining a
particular target, say the 1990 emission level of 7.4 GtC, will obviously ﬂuctuate depending on the
level of future uncontrolled emissions.
In additionto thebaseline, however,thereisconsiderableuncertaintyabout thecost of reducing
emissions below the baseline. A study by Nordhaus (1993) reports that a $30/tC tax might reduce
1Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future. Financial support from the National
Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged (Grant SBR-9711607). Richard Morgenstern, Raymond Kopp and
Richard Newell, along with seminar participantsat the CEA and RFF, provided valuable comments on an earlier draft.
The author alone is responsible for all remaining errors.
2Gigatons Carbon.
1emissions anywhere from 10 to 40%. While some models predict that a $300/tC would virtually
eliminate emissions, other models require a tax in excess of $400/tC. This wide range of reduction
estimates only compounds the uncertainty about baselines to generate extreme uncertainty about
the cost of a particular emission target ﬁfteen or twenty years in the future.
Motivated by the policy implications of these large uncertainties, this paper uses a modiﬁed
version of the Nordhaus (1994b) integrated climate-economy model in order to analyze alternative
policies under uncertainty. In particular, the model incorporates uncertainty about a wide range
of model parameters developed in both Nordhaus (1994b) and Pizer (1996). The simulations are
then sped up using a technique presented in Pizer (1996) that greatly facilitates computation. Key
elements of the model are discussed in the next section while speciﬁcs are covered in Appendix A.
Before presenting the multi-period policy results in Section 4, Section 3 presents a simpler
one-period analysis. This analysis, following Weitzman, uses marginal cost and beneﬁt estimates
derived from the full multi-period dynamic model to examine optimal policy for the single year
2010, ignoring the policy choice in future years. This simpler analysis provides considerable
intuition for the full multi-period policy analysis and, surprisingly, closely replicates the optimal
multi-period policy results in 2010.
The simulations indicate that an optimal permit policy would begin with a 13 GtC target in
2010, rising gradually over time to accomodate some economic growth. This policy generates $69
billion in expected net beneﬁts versus a no policy, business-as-usual alternative. Importantly, this
gain is very sensitive to correctly setting the target. Slightly morestringent targets lead to dramatic
welfare losses. Meanwhile, the optimal tax policy starts at $7/tC in 2010 and also rises gradually
over time. In contrast, this policy generates $337 billion in net beneﬁts and the gain is much less
sensitive to the exact choice of tax level.
As an alternativeto both thepuretax and permit policies, acombined hybridpolicy is proposed
(Roberts and Spence 1976; Weitzman 1978; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1997). Such a mechanism
wouldinvolveaninitialdistributionof tradeablepermits, withadditionalpermitsavailablefromthe
government at a speciﬁed “trigger” price. This system turns out to be only slightly more efﬁcient
2than a pure tax system, but allows a ﬂexible distribution of rents associated with emission rights
due to its permit system component. Perhaps moreimportantly for current policy discussions, sub-
optimal hybrid policies based on a stringent target and high trigger price have much better welfare
outcomes than a sub-optimal permit policy with the same target. Both the improved ﬂexibility and




The analysis presented in Weitzman (1974) concerns the choice of policy instrument used to regu-
late a market where either political considerations or market failure require government interven-
tion. A price (tax) or quantity (permit) instrument is at the government’s disposal and the question
posed by Weitzman is which of the two leads to the best welfare outcome, measured as net social
surplus.
3 Importantly,the policy must be ﬁxed before any uncertainty is resolved.
Withcompletecertaintyconcerningcosts, priceandquantitycontrolscanbeusedtoachievethe
sameoutcomes. For everyprice, thereisaproﬁtmaximizinglevel ofproductionwherepriceequals
marginalcost and forevery level of productionthereis an associated marginalcost. Notethat while
uncertaintyabout beneﬁts leads to uncertainwelfareoutcomes, it doesnot lead to uncertaintyabout
the level or marginal cost of production – these are determined by thestructure of costs. Therefore,
the two instruments (which affect production) can be used to obtain exactly the same production
outcome, generating the same set of welfare outcomes, as long as costs are known.
The interesting case arises when costs are not certain. Then, ﬁxing the marginal cost through
a price instrument leads to an uncertain level of production. Correspondingly, ﬁxing the level of
production with a quantity instrument leads to an uncertain marginal cost.
Weitzman’s basic result was that priceinstruments would be favored when the marginal beneﬁt
3Here and throughoutit is assumed that the quantity instrument is an efﬁcient quantity instrument;e.g. a tradeable
permit system with negligibletransaction costs.
3schedule was relatively ﬂat and quantity instruments would be favored when the marginal cost
schedule was relatively ﬂat. In particular, he derived an expression for the difference in expected





















2 is the variance of the shocks to the marginal cost schedule,
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0 is the slope of the (linear) marginal beneﬁt schedule.
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cost outcomes. Therefore, ﬁxing the price before the outcome is known leads to levels of control












j), theoptimal quantityis relativelyconstant over therange
of outcomes. In that case, ﬁxing the quantity in advance leads to results close to what would be
chosen after uncertainty is resolved. By choosing policies that provide levels of control close to
what what would be chosen after uncertainty is resolved, the deadweight loss is minimized. This
is shown visually in Figure 1.
2.2 Combining Taxes and Permits
Not long after Weitzman’s original article, several authors suggested using a hybrid permit policy
(Weitzman 1978; Roberts and Spence 1976) to regulate a market. That is, producers are given the
choice of either obtaining a permit in the marketplaceor purchasing a permit from the government
at a speciﬁed trigger price. Such a system works like a permit system by ﬁxing emissions as long
as the marginal cost (e.g., the price of the permit) lies below the trigger price and works like a tax
system by ﬁxing marginal cost when marginal cost hits the trigger price. When the trigger is set
4This result is derived for the case of linear marginal costs and beneﬁts, where uncertainty enters as small shifts to






0 are known with certainty). The uncertainty about costs is assumed to be
independent of the uncertainty about beneﬁts.
4Figure 1: Deadweight Loss of Taxes Versus Permits
a
Shallow Marginal Beneﬁts Favor Taxes Steep Marginal Beneﬁts Favor Permits




































































































2indicate alternative cost outcomes.
high, such a combined mechanism functions like a pure permit system (since additional permits
are never sold) and when the number of permits is set low, it functions like pure tax mechanism
(since additional permits are always sold). By encompassing both tax and permit mechanisms as
special cases, the hybrid policy should always perform at least as well as either one.
Recently, a paper by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997) proposed just such a hybrid policy to
addresstheproblemof global climatechange, but not basedonthese efﬁciencyarguments. Instead,
they discuss the merits of a hybrid policy in comparison to a strict 1990 emission target in a
certainty context. Based on a trigger price of $10/tC (at which price additional permits would
almost certainly be sold), McKibbin and Wilcoxen argue that the hybrid policy would lower costs,
improve monitoring and enforcement, and avoid disruptive international capital ﬂows. While the
lower cost would come at the expense of a less stringent policy, they argue that a 1990 target is
unrealistic. They also point out that a hybrid system would preserve the permit system’s ability
to ﬂexibly distribute the rents associated with emission rights while, at the margin, providing a
5revenue incentive for governments to enforce and monitor emissions.
5 Finally, they point out
that an efﬁcient international permit system involving international permit trades would lead to
potentially large trade distortions.
While their points concerning the beneﬁts of a hybrid policy under complete certainty are
important,they aretangential to the question addressed in this paper. That is, what arethe expected
welfare gains associated with alternative policies under uncertainty. More to the point, it turns out
that these welfare gains are large enough to potentially dwarf almost all other concerns.
2.3 Model Description
This analysis uses a global integrated climate economy model containing a stylized representation
of global economic activity and climate behavior. The stylized approach, based on Nordhaus
(1994b), is appropriate given this paper’s focus on uncertainty. While additional detail in both
the climate and economy modules might improve the results for a particular set of assumptions or
provide answers to other questions, it is unlikely that such embellishments would affect the range
of predicted aggregateoutcomes or the insight concerning optimal policy choice under uncertainty.
Economic behavior in this model involves a single sector of global economic activity. Global
capital and labor are combined to produce a generic output each year which is either consumed
or invested in additional capital. A representative agent chooses that amount of consumption each
period which maximizes her expected utility across time.
Climate change enters the model through the emission of greenhouse gases arising from eco-
nomic activity. These emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and lead to a higher global mean
temperature. This higher temperature then causes damages by reducing output according to a
quadratic damage function.
The opportunity to reduce the effect of climate change arises from the use of more expensive,
GHG reducing, production technologies. In particular, there is a cost function describing the re-
duction in output required to reduce emissions by a given fraction. This cost function captures
5As pointed out by Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1996), losing the revenue from such rents could also have impor-
tant welfare consequences.
6substitution both among and away from fossil fuels. While the cost of reductions in any period are
born entirely in that period, the consequences of reduced emissions persist far into the future due
to the longevity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Appendix A describes the model in more detail.
2.4 Key Modeling Assumptions
Repetto and Austin (1997) point out that many of the prediction differencesamong climate change
models can be linked to differences in a few key assumptions. For that reason, it is instructive to
highlight how such issues are handled in this model. Two of the assumptions they identify – the
use of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) frameworkand the provision of revenue recycling
options – are impossible to explore in this model (due to the fact that it is already a CGE model
without a government sector). However, the remaining assumptions considered by Repetto and
Austin are related to alternative descriptions of costs and beneﬁts.
Costs andbeneﬁtsvarywidelyinthismodel duetouncertainty. Still,realizedcosts andbeneﬁts
can be traced to two distinct sets of assumptions: those addressing underlying trends and those
addressing abatement costs and climate damages directly.
2.4.1 Trends
Trends are essential features in any model with long time horizons since they determine the course
of exogenous change. Particularlyin the climate change context, assumptions about (1) exogenous
population growth, (2) productivity improvements and (3) energy efﬁciency/carbon content deter-
mine the baseline of future uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions – and by extension the baseline
for costs and beneﬁts. This model combines the work of Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), Nordhaus
(1994b), Pizer (1996), and Nordhaus and Popp (1997) to characterize each of these trends. Within
each state of nature, these three trends are governed by an initial growth rate coupled with an
associated slowdown.
6
6The trend in productivitygrowth is further overlayed with a mean-zero random walk.
7Figure 2: Simulated CO2 Emission Distribution vs IPCC Scenarios









































aLines indicate the distribution of CO2 emission paths generated by
the model. These reﬂect controllable carbon equivalent GHG emissions,
scaled by the fraction due to CO2 (e.g., 86.6%; see p. 71, Nordhaus
1994b). Circles (
￿) indicate 1992 IPCC CO2 emission scenarios (p. 12,
IPCC 1992; pp. 101–112, Pepper et al. 1992); letters in right margin
refer to individualscenarios.
Table 1: Summary of Baseline Trend Assumptions
range source
Global Output ($ trillions, 1995) 24 Nordhaus (1994b)
a
Emissions/Output Ratio 0.385 Nordhaus (1994b)
a
(tC billions/$trillions,1995)
Population Growth (1995) 1.24% Nordhaus (1994b)
a











1% Nordhaus and Popp (1997)
Population Slowdown Rate 0.27 to 3.31% Nordhaus (1994b)
Productivity Slowdown Rate 0.20 to 2.43% Nordhaus (1994b)
(also used to slow the growth in the emissions/outputratio)
a Adjusted to 1995.
8While Table 1 summarizes the range of underlying trend assumptions, the consequent distribu-
tion of CO2 emission scenarios is shown in Figure 2 along with the 1992 IPCC projections. The
IPCC forecasts tend to fall between the 25th and 75th percentile in 2025 and between the 5th and
75th by the years 2050 and 2100. The median of the IPCC forecasts remains quite close to the
median (50th percentile) of the simulated emission levels throughout theforecast period. This sug-
gests that, relativeto the IPCC forecasts, themodel in this paper predicts a similar central tendency
but with a larger spread. In particular, this paper suggests that future uncontrolled emissions could
be much higher than all six of the IPCC forecasts. For several reasons, this is arguably a realistic
assessment.
First, it is important to recognize that the IPCC scenarios do not have a probabilistic interpreta-
tion. They are subjectively developed scenarios combining a large number of alternative assump-
tions in six particular combinations. Their two high emission scenarios, for example, alternatively
combine high population growth with lower per capita productivity growth, and vice versa. Fur-
ther, the underlying growth forecasts themselves have little if any probabilistic interpretation.
7
Second, even analyses that arewell-groundedinprobabilityoften underestimatetheprobability
of extreme events. This phenomena has been documented in everything from the measurement of
physical constants to the forecast of future energy demand (Shlyakhter and Kammen 1992). Such
results suggest that forecasts with “thicker tails” (like the distribution in Figure 2) are a more
realistic description of the likely outcome distribution.
Finally, the time horizon under consideration – over one hundred years – makes any forecast
based on historical data somewhat dubious. Such forecasts implicitly assume that recent historical
trends will continue far into the future without appreciable change. For example, based on recent
experiences with growth slowdowns, global CO2 emissions – which tripledover the last ﬁfty years
– are forecast to triple again only after one hundred years. It is quite plausible, however, that this
assumed slowdown could fail to materialize. If emissions continued to triple every ﬁfty years, this
7See Pepper et al. (1992) for further details. Note that early Census population forecasts using similar non-
probabilistic techniques often grossly misforecast population. For example, the forecast range given in 1966 (#381,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census) lies completely above the actual population reported in 1989
(#1045).
9would essentially agree with the 95% quantile of the predicted emission distribution.
All of these reasons indicate that while the assumptions in Table 1 and emission forecasts
in Figure 2 are not above question, they provide a reasonable probabilistic picture of the likely
emission outcomes.
2.4.2 Damages
Damages are perhaps the least understood aspect of climate change and at the same time one of
the most important. In this model, damages are modeled as a quadratic function of temperature
change, in turn determined by GHG concentrations. In particular,















T is the change in temperature relative to a pre-industrialization (1860) baseline and
D
0 is
a parameter describing the GDP reduction associated with a 3
￿ temperature increase.
8
In addition to the parameter describing the GDP loss from increased temperatures, two other
parameters affect the degree of climate damages. First, there is a parameter describing the fraction
of emitted GHGs which actually accumulate (versus those which are absorbed in the oceans).
Second, there is a parameter describing the change in temperature for a doubling of atmospheric
GHG concentrations. Table 2 describes the range of assumed values for all three parameters.
There are also two implicit assumptions which inﬂuence the ﬁnal results concerning taxes and
permits. The ﬁrst is that climate damage is presumed to be a gradually occuring phenomenon
(represented by a quadratic function). The fact that damages from increased GHG concentrations
rise smoothly and gradually contributes to the relatively ﬂat marginal beneﬁt schedule discussed
in Section 3.1. In contrast, a damage function that involved sudden and/or critical phenomena –
such as thebreachingof aconcentrationthresholdgeneratingdramaticallyhigher damages– would
lead to a steeper or perhaps stepwise damagefunction(though uncertaintyabout thethreshold level
would tend to smooth the expected damage function).









2 as long as the damages are less
than 5% of GDP. The more complex speciﬁcation simply prevents global GDP from becoming negative.
10Table 2: Summary of Climate Damage and Abatement Cost Assumptions
a
probability parameter
equals the given value
description 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Damage Assumptions:
fraction of emitted CO2 which accumulates 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.78
change in temperature from CO2 doubling 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.7 4.4
GDP loss
b for 3 degree rise in temperature 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.6 3.2
Cost Assumptions:
GDP loss
b for 100% reductions 2.7 3.4 6.9 8.0 13.3
GDP loss
b to obtain 1990 emissions in 2010
c 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.41
aSource: Nordhaus and Popp (1997).
bAs a percent of global GDP.
cAssuming a 30% reduction from baseline.
The second, less controversial, assumption is that damages are related to the stock of GHGs
in the atmosphere and not the annual ﬂow. This contrasts with traditional pollutants, such as
particulates, SOx, NOx, etc., whose damages are related to annual ﬂows. Stock pollutants by
their nature will have relatively ﬂat beneﬁt curves associated with emission reductions since the
reductions in any period have a relatively small effect on the total stock. Even though emissions
in one period persist far into the future, the volume of emissions in a single period always remains
a tiny fraction of the existing stock. If the total stock changes by a small amount – even if that
change persists – the marginal beneﬁt schedule remains essentially constant.
To better understand this phenomenon, imagine a pollutant, like carbon dioxide, where it as-
sumed that damages depend on the stock of the pollutant. Presumably, the damages themselves
are not linear (i.e., directly proportional to concentrations) but rise by an increasing amount as the
stock rises. The damage from the ﬁrst ton of CO2 above the preindustrial baseline is small, while
the incremental damage from an additional ton of CO2 on top of current concentrations is much
larger – as depicted in the top panel of Figure 3. In that panel, damages from the ﬁrst ton of CO2
above the preindustrial baseline are around $1/tC but damages from an additional ton of CO2 once
emissions reach the current level of 760 GtC are over $20/tC.
Nowsuppose that total annual emissions arecurrently10 GtCand, for simplicity,a ton ofemis-
11Figure 3: Stylized Relationship Between Stock Damages and Emission Damages
a
stock (GtC)
(increased reductions     )
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aThis ﬁgure highlightsthe fact that reductions in any one period are a relatively small
fractionofthetotalstockof GHGs. Therefore, forany smoothdamage functiondetermined
bytheGHGstock(inturnimplyingsomewhatlinearmarginaldamages fortheGHGstock),
the marginal damage function for emissions in any one period is essentially ﬂat. It simply
expands a tiny segment of the stock marginal damage schedule over the range of possible
policy choices. This ignores the possibilitythat emission reductions in one period may be
associated with emission reductions in other periods, in turn leading to a steeper slope in
the future.
12sion reductions translates into exactly one ton of reduced stock.
9 Even if emissions are reduced
to zero, the stock – and by extension marginal damages – fall only slightly, as shown in the lower
panel of Figure 3. This is because annual emissions are only a small fraction of the total stock.
There are three important caveats to this point. The ﬁrst, noted above, is that damages are
assumed toberelativelysmooth. If,forexample, themarginaldamages rosedramaticallyat around
750 GtC, the graphical argument in Figure 3 would fail. The second is that there are likely to be
ancillary beneﬁts associated with GHG reductions. In particular, the reduced burning of fossil
fuels promises to reduce concentrations of particulate matter, SOx and NOx, all of which have
non-trivial morbidity and mortality beneﬁts.
1
0
Finally, it presumes that reductions in different periods are unrelated. If reductions in one
periodareaccomplishedonly inconjunctionwith reductionsinotherperiods,such apresumptionis
wrong. As an extreme example, suppose emission reductions in one period imply equal reductions
in all future periods. In this scenario, emission reductions in one period would eventually lead to
proportional reductions in the stock after enough periods elapsed. While Figure 3 would be an
appropriate rendering of the immediate effect of emission reductions on the pollutant stock, the
effect on the stock in future periods would be more dramatic as the associated reductions in future
periods took effect.
There are several reasons to think that such a relation is plausible. First, certain decisions
about emission reductions – namely investments in research, ﬁxed plant and equipment – affect
emissions in many periods. While it is unlikely that marginal adjustments in emissions would be
completely restricted by such decisions, some linkages are inevitable. Second, some policies, such
as taxes, will lead to increased or decreased controls in every period depending on whether costs
turn out to be high or low in each state of nature. In both cases, however, it remains an empirical
question whether these effects signiﬁcantly affect the otherwise ﬂat slope of the marginal beneﬁt
schedule.
9Inreality ittranslates intosomethingless than atonof reduced stockin theatmospheresince between 25 and 50%
of emissions are quickly absorbed in the oceans.
1
0See, for example, Burtraw and Toman (1997).
132.4.3 Costs
The cost of reducing GHG emissions below the uncontrolled baseline is based on a survey of stud-
ies summarized in Nordhaus (1993). These studies consider the cost of reducing GHG emissions
through various means, including the use of speciﬁc technologies, econometric estimates of fuel
substitution, and mathematical programming. The relationship and range of estimates is approxi-
mated in Nordhaus (1994b) by a power rule,













1 takes on the values shown in Table 2.
More important than the particular numbers entering the cost function, however, are the as-
sumptions that (1) marginal costs rise more and more steeply as additonal reductions are under-
taken and (2) that the choice of emission level is an annual decision involving an annual cost
function. Both of these points are crucial because they affect the relative slope of marginal costs.
This, in turn, affects the difference in expected welfare between taxes and permits discussed in
Section 2.1.
If, for example, we believe that substantial reductions of GHGs will involve the development
of new carbon-free technologies, it seems reasonable that the marginal cost of reducing emissions
willeventually ﬂattenoncethosetechnologiesarebroughton-line. Thiswill diminishtheargument
that marginal beneﬁts are relatively ﬂat comparedto costs. Alternatively, many decisions to reduce
emissions – such as investment in innovativeresearch or in new capital – aremade over horizons of
decades rather than annually. This introduces a positive correlation of among costs and potentially
reductions in different periods. As pointed out previously, such correlation makes the beneﬁts
associated with a reduction decision in one period more valuable than the actual reductions in that
period alone. This effect tends to favor quantity controls.
143 Single-PeriodPolicy Simulations
Given the long-term nature of climate change, a policy to reduce GHG emissions inevitably in-
volves decisions over periods of years or decades. However, understanding the differences be-
tween GHGtax and permitmechanisms underuncertainty iscomplicated when policiesareviewed
as paths for tax and permit levels, rather than single-period, single-valued choices. With that in
mind, this section presents welfare results for a single-period policy analysis – reductions in GHG
emissions in the year 2010. Since a single dimension captures the range of policies in this context,
graphs can be used to view policy consequences. It should be emphasized that while the policy
is only implemented in a single period, the measurement of costs and beneﬁts especially includes
consequences over a 250 year horizon. Section 4 discusses the multi-period policy results.
3.1 Marginal Costs and Beneﬁts
While there are a number of strong assumptions in the Weitzman analysis which are inappropriate
for examining climate change policy, it remains a sensable starting point. Based on that principle,
the obvious question is how the marginal costs and beneﬁts of GHG emission reductions in the
year 2010 compare in terms of relative slopes. In order to answer this question, the integrated
assessment model outlinedin Section2.3 and describedin detail in AppendixA is used tocompute
costs and beneﬁts.
First, the welfare associated with different levels of emissions in 2010 is computed in net
present (2010) value terms for several thousand randomized trials. Marginal beneﬁts are computed
by numerically differentiating the derived schedule of beneﬁts. Second, the cost associated with
achieving different levels of emissions in 2010 is computed based on the model’s cost function
for the same set of randomized trials. This cost is similarly numerically differentiated to obtain
marginal costs in the year 2010. In some trials and for some levels of emissions, the cost is zero
since the given emission level may be higher than actual uncontrolled emissions. Achieving the
speciﬁed emission level in such cases is costless.
These two calculations result in a distribution of marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs at dif-
15Figure 4: Distribution of Marginal Costs and Beneﬁts in 2010
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2010 emission level (GtC, increasing reductions      )
aMarginal costs are based on dollar value ($2010) of lost global GDP in order to reduce emissions at
or below the indicated level. In those cases where uncontrolled emissions are below the indicated level, the
marginal cost is zero. Marginal beneﬁts are based on the dollar value ($2010) of the net present value of
forgone damages at the given emission levels. These foregone damages hold constant all future emissions at
their baseline level. Values are expressed in $2010and, due to differentdiscount rates across states of nature,
will not be weighted equally when balancing costs and beneﬁts.
ferent levels of emission. Figure 4 attempts to summarize these distributions by showing how
the different quantiles of marginal costs and beneﬁts vary over the range of emissions considered.
Keeping in mind that 1990 GHG emissions were around 8.5 GtC, the left-hand panel indicates
that achieving 1990 emission levels in 2010 would involve a marginal cost of between zero and
$180/ton – a very wide range. This large variation occurs for two reasons: (1) marginal costs are
assumed to rise steeply given the speciﬁed cost function, and (2) the baseline emissions in 2010
are not known with certainty. This panel essentially depicts a distribution of fairly steep curves
whose horizontal intercept is unknown.
The right panel, in contrast, indicates constant but still unknown marginal beneﬁts. As sug-
gested earlier, the fact that damages due to GHGs depend on their stock in the atmosphere rather
than emissions in any one year, coupled with the fact that GHGs remain in the atmosphere for a
very long time, makes marginal beneﬁts insensitive to the level of annual emissions in a single
year. For example, in 1995 the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere was 760 GtC (170 GtC above the
pre-industrialbaseline) and annual emissionswerearound 10 GtC.The differencein stock between
16Figure 5: Expected Marginal Costs and Beneﬁts in 2010
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no reductions and 100% reductions in 1995 is only 6% of the stock,
1
1 making it unlikely that the
marginal beneﬁt of the ﬁrst ton of reductions is much different than the marginal beneﬁt of the last
ton.
Taking expectations across these marginal costs and beneﬁts yields the schedules shown in
Figure 5. Under the assumptions made by Weitzman, the optimal permit level is simply emission
level where expected marginal beneﬁts equal expected marginal costs and the optimal tax level is




￿ indicate the optimal
tax and permit policies in 2010 for controlling GHG emissions.
Visually, it is apparent that expected marginal beneﬁts are ﬂatter than expected marginal costs.







































0. This allows a rough calculation of the welfare gain of




























5 billion. Discounting this
to 1995 (the base year of the model) with a 6% discount rate generates an estimated gain of $10
billion from using taxes instead of permits – just in the year 2010.
In addition to the welfare difference, it is interesting to compare the optimal quota in 2010 to
1
1This ignores the fact that perhaps only 50% accumulates.
17Figure 6: Histogram of Uncontrolled 2010 Emissions Levels





















































aGHG emissions include CO2 and CFCs. 1990 emissions are based
on 7.4 GtC of CO2 and 1.1 GtC of CFCs (p. 71, Nordhaus 1994b). The
1990 emissions also correspond to data from IPCC(1992), p. 12, using
a factor of 1300 to convert tons of CFCs into tons of carbon equivalent
global warming potential (GWP) (Lashof and Ahuja 1990). The optimal
2010 permit level is discussed in the text.
the range of actual emissions. Figure 6 shows 1990 emissions (a target under consideration), the
optimal 2010 permit level, and the distribution of uncontrolled emissions in 2010. Roughly half
of the emission scenarios involve uncontrolled emissions below the optimal permit level (versus
around 3% below the 1990 level). That is, implementing the optimal permit policy would result in
non-binding targets half the time.
Why is the optimal permit policy so loose? Intuitively, uncertainty about baseline emissions
is large relative to reductions and a large amount of reductions is costly. Therefore committing to
an emission target which is almost surely below all forecasts (such as 1990 emissions levels) will
involve extremely high costs in the event of high growth and high baseline emissions. The risk
of such high costs, even taking into account the highest estimated beneﬁts, are unjustiﬁed in this
model and lead one to prefer a less stringent (higher) target.
18Figure 7: Welfare Consequences of Pure Tax and Permit Instruments in 2010
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3.2 Welfare Consequences of Pure Tax and Permit Mechanisms
Whilethepreviousanalysis based on Figure5 providesimportantintuitionand a roughapproxima-
tion of the welfare consequences of taxes and permits, it fails to capture several important failures
of the Weitzman assumptions. While the intuition behind these failures and their individual conse-
quences is discussed in Appendix C, this section summarizes their net effect. In particular, the net
welfare gains of alternative tax and permit policies are computed numerically and shown in Figure
7.
These results simply conﬁrm the intuition in Figure 5. Namely the welfare gain from the op-
timal tax instrument, around $2.5 billion, is much larger than the gain from the optimal permit
instrument, around $0.3 billion. Although the rough calculation using Weitzman’s formula sug-
gested a difference of $10 billion, there are many reasons why Weitzman’s result is not exactly
right in this context as discussed in Appenidix C.
Figure 7 also indicates the large risk associated with setting an emission target incorrectly –
speciﬁcally setting a target too low. While the net beneﬁts of a tax are positive for a wide range
of values, from zero to $20/ton C, the net beneﬁts of a permit system rapidly become negative as
the target falls below 11 GtC. At the proposed 1990 emission level, 8.5 GtC, the welfare loss is
more than $10 billion. This is a consequence of reductions becoming extremely expensive in the
19high-emission states of the world. Thus, an important conclusion from Figure 7 is that low targets
could turn out to be very costly. Importantly, were the world to confront such high costs, in all
likelihood the parties to any global climate agreement would agree to relax their commitments.
The fact that such a potential even exists could then lead to strategic behavior in the private sector
in order to make costs appear high, a point returned to in Section 4.5.
3.3 The Hybrid Permit Policy
As pointed out by Roberts and Spence (1976), a hybrid permit policy which encompasses permits
and taxes and special cases will performat least as well as either alternative. It is natural to wonder
whether it can do much better. Figure 8 shows that, in fact, it cannot; the optimal hybrid policy
is only marginally better than the optimal pure tax policy. The global optimum across all permit
levels and trigger prices, roughly a 5 GtC emission target and a $7/ton C trigger, is remarkably
close to the proposal suggested by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997).
1
2
The proper way to read Figure 8 is to note that for low permit levels (
<
5 GtC; back right edge
of ﬁgure), the policy is essentially a tax and the shape of the surface is simply an extrusion of the




0 tC), the policy
is essentially a permit system and follows the permit curve shown in Figure 7. The outline of this
shape is just beginning to show along the front right edge of the ﬁgure. For higher permit levels
and lower trigger prices (essentially the middle of the ﬁgure), some combination of permits and
taxes is at work, indicated by the odd shape of the surface.
While the optimal hybrid policy appears to be no better than the optimal tax policy, it clearly
performs better than the optimal permit policy. In fact, relative to a straight target of 1990 emis-
sions, with its attendant $10 billion loss from Figure 7, any of the policies shown in Figure 8 are
an order of magnitude better (note the vertical scale only descends to a $2 billion loss). As long as
policydebatecontinuestofocusontargetsandtimetables, rather thantaxes, these twocomparisons
are most relevant.
1
2They advocated 1990emission levels as the permitvolume coupled witha $10/tonC trigger. 1990global control-
lable GHG emissions were 8.5 GtC.




































































tax rate ($/ton carbon) permit level (GtC)
optimum when taxes are not used
(13 GtC)a
optimum when permits are not used
($7 /ton C)
global optimum using taxes and permits
($7 /ton C, 5 GtC)
aThe optimal permit level when additional permits are no longer purchased (13 GtC)
does notbecome apparent untilthe triggerprice is set roughlytwice as highas showninthe
ﬁgure (around $50/ton carbon), otherwise the additional permits are purchased in a non-
trivialnumber ofstates of nature. Fromtheﬁgure, itis evidentthat theoptimalpermit level
as a function of the trigger price is increasing. At $25/ton carbon, however, the optimal
permit level is only11 GtC. The net expected beneﬁt when the trigger price is high enough
to no longer matter and the permit level is 13 GtC is $0.3 billion, roughly one-tenth of the
beneﬁt from a straight tax or hybrid permit policy.
214 Multi-period Policy Under Uncertainty
Up to this point the analysis has focused on the costs and beneﬁts of different policies in a single
year. The problem of climate change, however, is spread out over decades if not centuries. Policies
to combat climate change are therefore likely to be in place for a long time. It is not immediately
obvious whether the results comparing different instruments in a single year are immediately ap-
plicable to a multiperiod policy (since policies in future periods may change the optimal policy in
2010).
In this section optimal policy paths for taxes, permits and hybrid permit mechanism are ex-
plored. In addition to considering the net welfare consequences of optimal policies, results con-
cerning the range of climate outcomes are presented and sub-optimal policies are explored.
4.1 Optimal Permit Policy
To compute optimal policies, the paths of alternative permit, tax and hybrid permit systems were
parameterized with six values describing stringency in 2010 (the ﬁrst year of implementation),
2020,2040,2070,2110 and2160. Policiesininterveningyearsarebased on smoothinterpolations,
1
3
except the stringency in 2160 which is allowed to be discontinous and is held ﬁxed through the end
of the simulation (2245). The length of the simulation as well as the spacing of the policy param-
eters was subjectively chosen to make the policy evaluation in the 2000-2100 interval as accurate
as possible, especially the early 2000-2050 period.
The resulting optimized permit policy, which limits global greenhouse gas emission to a spec-
iﬁed level, is shown in Figure 9. The policy is not known with certainty due to sampling error –
only 8,000 states of nature were used to estimate the policy (this could be reduced with additional
computing power).
1
4 Interestingly, the optimal permit level of 13 GtC in 2010 is roughly the same
as the optimal permit level determined in the one-period analysis. Perhaps this is not so surprising
1
3Policies are interpolated to ten-year intervals using a cubic spline; annual policies are linearly interpolated from
the ten-year values. The hybridpolicy is always interpolatedlinearly due to sampling error.
1
4The stringency was optimized over eight sets of 1,000 states of nature, taking on average 30 minutes to converge.
These eight sets were then averaged and the standard deviation among the eight estimates was used to compute a
standard error for the average.
22Figure 9: Optimized Permit Level – Multi-period Policy
(dashed lines indicate 95% conﬁdence interval)



























given the fact that initial emission reductions do not substantially affect the GHG stock for many
years, at which point the discounted beneﬁts in 2010 will be small.
1
5
An important observation is that the proposal to reduce emissions to their 1990 levels (roughly
8.5 GtC) is far below the optimal permit level in these simulations. Further, the optimal permit
level rises in the future to accomodate growth in population and per capita productivity. While
this kind of policy might appear to ignore the possibility that a carbon-free technology becomes
not only commerically available but dominant in the next century, it conversely accomodates the
possibility that such a technology never gets off the ground.





5An important assumption in the underlying DICE model is that damages are continuous and have been occuring
since the beginning of industrialization. Thus we are already experiencing the consequences of global warming and
current emission reductions are predominately concerned with reducing damages for roughlythe next 30 years.
1
6This is the net present value of beneﬁts minus costs and has an associated sampling error of $16 billion. This can
be compared to annual global output in 1995 which was $24 trillion.
23Figure 10: Optimized Tax Level – Multi-period Policy




























4.2 Optimal Tax Policy
While the permit policy requires that emissions in every state of nature be at or below the speciﬁed
level, a tax policy instead ﬁxes themarginal cost of emission reductions. Consumers and producers
facing a tax on greenhouse gas emissions will reduce emissions until the cost of further reductions
equals thecost of payingthetax instead. If costs areparticularlylow, emissions maybe completely
eliminated and the marginal cost of the last ton of reductions will lie below the speciﬁed tax rate.
Figure 10 shows the tax policy which maximizes expected welfare. The initial tax of $7.35 is
close to, but slightly lower than, the tax computed in the one-period analysis. Unlike the optimal
permit policy, which rises and relaxes in stringency in order to accomodate growth, the optimal tax
policy becomes more stringent in the future. This occurs because, unlike a constant permit level,
a constant tax automatically encourages proportionally higher emissions as the economy grows.
While some increase in emissions is desirableas the economy grows, a proportionalincrease is not
– therefore the tax must increase in stringency while the permit system must be relaxed.
1
7
An important difference between tax and permit policies is that taxes do not provide a strict
1
7An alternative interpretation of the rising tax rate is that, since emissions in adjacent periods generate essentially
the same consequences, the shadow price of emissions must rise with the interest rate.
24Figure 11: Distribution of Emission Levels Under Alternative Policies









































limit on emissions. This, however, should not be viewed strictly as a weakness: relaxing the
level of emissions when costs turn out to be particularly high is desirable if the expected marginal
beneﬁts of reduction are fairly constant. Figure 11 shows the distribution of resulting emissions
with and without the optimal tax policy alongside the optimal permit policy. Note that the optimal
permit policy is not binding in over 75% of the states of nature (it lies above the 75th quantile of
baseline emissions). Meanwhile theoptimal taxpolicy leadsto emissions above theoptimal permit
level in somewhere between 5 and 25% of the states of nature.
Finally, if the welfare changes associated with the optimal tax policy are averaged across states
of nature, the expected welfare improvement amounts to $338 billion – compared to $69 for the
permit instrument (the standard error in this case is $21 billion). This represents an expected
improvement ﬁve times higher than that obtained with the permit system – a large ratiobut smaller
than the factor of eight determined in the one-period analysis.
Why might this ratio decline when viewed over a longer horizon? As pointed out by Weitz-
man (1974), discussed later by Stavins (1996), and pointed out in Section 2.4, positive correlation
between marginal costs and beneﬁts leads to a preference for quantity instruments (e.g., permits).
In the case of a stock pollutant, such correlation is likely over long periods of time due to uncer-
tainty about baseline emissions. In a state of nature with particularly low uncontrolled, baseline
25Figure 12: Optimal Initial Permit Distribution for a Hybrid Permit Policy











































emissions, the pollutant stock is lower in the future making marginal damages lower. At the same
time, lower emissions make any single period target cheaper to obtain. The reverse occurs in states
of nature with high baseline emissions. This positive correlation among costs and beneﬁts induces
some preference for quantity controls. Based on the fact that price controls still offer a ﬁve-to-one
improve over quantity controls, however, the empirical consequence of this effect is still quite low.
4.3 Optimal Hybrid Permit Policy
The trigger price path for the optimal hybrid permit policy turns out to be insigniﬁcantly different
than the optimal tax level. As suggested in Figure 8, the corresponding optimal target is difﬁcult
to determine since the expected beneﬁts are relatively ﬂat over a range of values. This occurs
because the marginal effect of the policy is derived only from those states of nature where baseline
emissions are above the permit level but marginal costs are below the trigger – this turns out to be
a relatively small fraction of the sample. The wide conﬁdence intervals in Figure 12 reveals this




8This sampling error could be reduced with additionalsimulations.
26Table 3: Net Beneﬁts of Hybrid Policies with 1990 Emission Targets
(expected NPV in $1989 billions;policies begin in 2010)
trigger expected sampling
price ($/tC)









no trigger price -3359 104
aBoth the trigger price and target are ﬁxed from
2010 forward.
Interestingly,the optimal initial permit level remainsclose to the 1990 emission level (8.5 GtC)
for almost the entire forecast period. Setting the intitial distribution to 8.5 GtC in every period, in
fact, has a negligible effect on the welfare as long as the optimal tax level is used as the trigger
price (as was true in the one-period case).
4.4 Sub-optimalPolicies
The purpose of this paper has been to compareoptimal tax, permit and hybrid policies for reducing
GHG emissions. However, many of the policy proposals actually under consideration deviate from
those discussed in this paper. For that reason, this section considers the welfare consequences
of sub-optimal policies. Speciﬁcally, the welfare consequences of hybrid policies involving 1990
emission targets coupled with alternative, ﬁxed trigger prices are presented in Table 3.
Not surprisingly,the “no trigger price”option(e.g., a straight permit solution) entails the great-
est losses, on the order of $3 trillion. In the one-period simulations, a key result was that low
quantity targets generate large welfare losses. This result carries over to the multi-period context.
Surprisingly, however, trigger prices as high as $50/tC still generate positive welfare gains even
though the optimal price (shown in Figure 10) remains below $50/tC for the next 100 years.
A second important conclusion from Table 3 is that even as the trigger price approaches
27$100/tC, the expected welfare gain remains an order of magnitude better than the straight per-
mit approach. At $100/tC, the expected loss is capped below $300 billion – versus $3 trillion
under the straight permit system. Even with a tax of $250/tC (not shown), the expected loss is cut
in half. This highlights the role of a trigger price as an “escape valve” for adverse cost outcomes.
In 2010, there is barely a one-in-fourchance that additional permits would be sold at $100/tC. Yet,
the expected loss is reduced by a factor of ten. Regardless of whether one is conﬁdent about the
exact welfare outcomes presented in this paper, the potential for a hybrid permit policy to reduce
extremely adverse cost outcomes should be clear.
4.5 Non-efﬁciency Issues
While the metric used to compare policies in this paper has been economic efﬁciency, there are
obviously many other features associated with different policies which are important. As noted
by Stavins (1989), criteria such as feasibility and provision of dynamic incentives matter both to
policymakers and for welfare more broadly deﬁned. In this regard, it is useful to note that the
hybrid permit policy offers several advantages over the pure tax and permit alternatives.
In the case of permits, it seems unlikely that a world confronted with exceptionally and unex-
pectedly high compliance costs would continue to abide by a treaty based on a somewhat arbitrary
target (e.g., 1990 emissions). Such a possibility opens the door for strategic behavior under a
straight permit policy. Namely, ﬁrms have some incentive to make costs look high in order to en-
courage countries to opt out of treaty commitments– that would beneﬁt the ﬁrms since they would
stand to gain additional emission rights. In order to make costs look high, innovative research
might be deferred and older, less efﬁcient plants might be kept on-line longer.
In contrast, a hybrid permit policy provides an automatic relief mechanism to deal with un-
expectedly high costs: additional and unlimited permits are sold at the ﬁxed trigger price. Firms
have no incentive to misrepresent costs because, regardless of how they represent costs, their only
option is to pay for additional permits at the margin. In other words, the certainty of a trigger
price is a much better signal to ﬁrms to move forward on new investments and research to reduce
28emissions than an uncertain government adjustment of emission targets.
Regarding taxes, as McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997) point out, the potential tax burden associ-
ated with GHGemissionsis enormous. With agigaton ofemissions in theU.S. aloneand a$10 tax,
this amountsto $10 billion. If thetax ratewere$100 – still reasonable given a 1990 emission target
– the burden would be $100 billion. Given the U.S. recent experience with the proposed BTU tax,
such a policy would appear to be politically infeasible. The hybrid policy, in contrast, would allow
any fraction of that burden to be distributed ﬂexibly. By choosing which fraction of the permits to
distribute freely and which fraction to auction, policymakers can balance the competing interests
of revenue, equity and political feasibility.
5 Conclusion
Discussions of alternative tax and permit mechanisms for combating climate change have gener-
ally ignored the fact that the costs and beneﬁts of future reductions are highly uncertain. Such
uncertainty can lead to large efﬁciency differences between the two policies. This paper has ex-
plored this question in the context of an integrated climate-economy model capable of simulating
thousands of uncertain states of nature.
The resulting welfare analysis indicates that taxes are much more efﬁcient than permits for
controlling GHG emissions – by a factor of ﬁve to one ($337 billion versus $69 billion in net
beneﬁts). This derives from the relatively ﬂat marginal beneﬁt curve associated with emission re-
ductions. Relatively ﬂat marginal beneﬁts are partially a product of the quadratic damage function
and partially a generic feature of stock pollutants like GHGs.
An important observation in this analysis is the risk involved in setting permit level too strin-
gently. Not only does the optimal permit policy involve lower welfare gains, but setting the permit
level incorrectly can lead to massive losses. The tax instrument, in contrast, leads to welfare gains
over a much wider range of values.
In additionto puretax and permitsystems, thispaper explored thepossibility of ahybridpermit
system. The hybrid policy involves an initial allocation of permits followed by the subsequent sale
29of additional permits at ﬁxed trigger price if costs turn out to be high. By making the initial
distribution small or the subsequent sale price high, this combined system can be made to mimic
either the pure tax or permit system.
The hybrid permit system improves on the optimal tax outcome, but only slightly (by about $2
billion or 0.5%). However, the hybrid policy offers the ﬂexibility of a permit mechanism in terms
of distributing the rents associated with emission rights. Further, a sub-optimal hybrid policy with
a stringent target and high trigger price generates much better welfare outcomes than a straight
permit policy with the same target. Taken together, the improved ﬂexibility and welfare outcomes
enhance the credibility of the hybrid policy relative to either the permit or tax policy alone. Such




Economic behavior within each state is derived from a representative agent model where con-
sumption must be optimally allocated across time. In a typical model with constant exogenous
productivity growth, agent preferences deﬁne a steady state to which the economy converges over
time. In the presence of random shocks and slowly changing trends, the economy instead con-
verges to a distribution of states (due to the random shocks) which is itself slowly evolving (due
to the slowly changing trends). For the moment we ignore these changing trends and focus on a
standard stochastic growth model.
Therepresentativeconsumerin thismodelexhibitsconstant relativeriskaversion
￿ withrespect
to consumption per capita. Utility is separable across time, discounted at rate
￿ and weighted
each period by population. With the further assumption that preferences satisfy the von Neuman-


















































t is consumption in period
t and
N
t is population. That is, the consumer maximizes
























































t is effective labor input and
K




measure of productivity distinct from capital but not completely exogenous, as discussed later.
The parameter
￿ summarizes the Cobb-Douglas production technology given in Equation (A.2)
31and
￿
k reﬂects the rate of capital depreciation in the capital accumulation equation (A.3). Finally,














This is always satisﬁed by assuming zero growth asymptotically.





t, the dynamic optimization prob-













































































) – yields a close approximation of
optimal consumer behavior around the balanced growth steady state. This technique of approxi-
mating optimal dynamicbehavior has its originsin the real business cycle literaturebeginning with




Intuitively, Equation (A.5) approximates behavior around a balanced growth steady state. At































































= constant. If some unforseen shock moves the econ-












2 is negative, e.g., the steady state is





















) is too low, capital accumulation will
increase. Importantly, even if the growth rate of
A
￿
t is not constant, this approximation performs
well as long as expected productivity growth changes gradually.
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32A.2 Long-term Growth, Climate Behavior and Damages






t. This includes exogenous growth projections, climate behavior and damages from global
warming (based primarily on the DICE model, Nordhaus 1994b). Exogenous labor productivity
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a is the initial growth rate,
￿
a is the annual decline in the growth rate,
￿
a is the standard
deviation of the random growth shocks and
￿
t is a standard NIID random shock. This means
that productivity growth begins with a mean growth rate of
￿
a (around 1.3%) in the ﬁrst period
and eventually declines to zero. In addition, random and permanent shocks change the level of






t is distinguished from this exogenous measure
A




describes the amount of output available for consumption and investment – after output has been
reduced by control costs and climate damages. To that end,
A
￿
t is expressed as
A
t multiplied by a












































t is the fractional reduction in greenhouse gas emissions at time
t (the “control rate”) versus a









2 are both positive, additional rates of control involve reductions
in net productivity.
T
t is the average surface temperature relative to pre-industrialization in de-
grees Celsius and
D
0 is the fractional loss in aggregate GDP from a 3
￿ temperature increase. For
temperature changes less than 10
￿, this is essentially a quadratic damage function.
2
1 Additional
detailsabout thecontrolcost and damagefunctionscan befound in Nordhaus(1993)and Nordhaus
(1994a), respectively.
2
1Over larger ranges, the damage function becomes
S-shaped.

































n is the initial growth rate and
￿
n is the annual decline in the growth rate. Note that these
models predict zero growth asymptotically, though this may occur centuries in the future.
2
2
The remaining portion of the model explains the link between economic activity (measured as
aggregate output
Y
t) and warming (measured as the average surface temperature
T
t). The ﬁrst step















































reﬂects raw output prior to the effects of climate damages and control costs. The model of
￿
t is, as
































￿ is the initial growth rate of emissions/output (a negative number) and
￿
a is the annual
decline in the growth rate. Note that the annual decline in the emissions/output growth rate is the
same as the annual decline in labor productivity growth (
￿
a).
































t is the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases in billionsof tons of carbon equiv-
alent.
￿ is a measure of the retention rate of emissions. Low values of
￿ indicate that emissions do
2

















))leads to a halving of
the growth rates every 20 to 200 years.
2
3See discussion of controllable versus uncontrollable greenhouse gases in Nordhaus (1994b), page 74. For the
most part, controllable greenhouse gases are CO2 and CFCs and uncontrollablegreenhouse gases are everything else.
34not, in fact, accumulate while a value of unity would mean that every ton of emitted greenhouse
gases remains in the atmosphere. The parameter
￿
m plays the role of a depreciation rate: it is as-
sumed that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere above the pre-industrialization level of 590 billion
tons slowly decays. This decay reﬂects absorption of greenhouse gases into the oceans which are
assumed to be an inﬁnite sink.
Aboveaverageconcentrationsofgreenhousegasesin theatmospherelead toincreased radiative
forcings, a measure of the rate of transfer between solar energy produced by the sun and thermal































t measures radiative forcings in units of watts per meter squared. The speciﬁcation is such
that a doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations leads to a roughly four fold increase in forcings
(since 590 is the concentration before industrialization).
O
t in this relation represents radiative



































































































































t is the surface temperature and
T
￿
t is the deep ocean temperature, both expressed in















t will equilibriate to zero. The parameter
￿ describes
the equilibrium change in surface temperature for a given change in radiative forcings. In par-
ticular, based on (A.13) and (A.15), a doubling of the concentration of greenhouse gases in the
























2 describe the thermal capacity of the surface atmosphere and
deep oceans and the rate of energy transfer between them, respectively.
A.3 Social Welfare
Adistinguishingfeatureofthisanalysis istheuseof an econometricallyestimated parameterdistri-
bution describing uncertainty in the economic model. However, the consumer’s objective function
given by Equation (A.1) makes no allowancefor uncertainty about thepreferenceparameters
￿ and
￿ which areﬁxed fromhis or her perspective. In orderto encompass uncertainty about preferences,
it is necessary to step back and imagine a social planner who would like to maximize the objective
given in (A.1) but is unsure of the parameters. Since a policy change which raises the expected
utility for one set of parameters may lower the expected utility for another set, the social planner
will need to specify a social welfare function to compare gains and losses across states of nature.
This social welfarefunctionprovidesa singleobjectivespecifyinghowchanges in utilitymeasured
with different preferences are aggregated.
2
5 It is important to recognize that although parameter
values in the representative agent model can be inferred from observed consumer behavior, there
is no information available to estimates parameters in a social welfare function. Such information
would be revealed only by observing the behavior of an actual social planner. Instead, we must
rely on social choice theory and our own sense of fairness to specify the relation.
It is useful to note that the common approach in the climate change literature skirts this issue
of preference aggregation by reporting a range of policy prescriptions based on a range of possible
preferences and states of nature. For example, Cline (1992) presents beneﬁt-cost analyses for 92
different cases (Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Dowlatabadi and Morgan (1993) integrate out much of the un-
certainty in their analysis, but still present results for 48 scenarios. Chapter 8 of Nordhaus (1994b)
gives one of the few examples where even preference uncertainty is integrated out, yielding a sin-
gle welfare metric and a single policy recommendation. In a similar analysis, however, Nordhaus
and Popp (1997) choose to ﬁx preferences because of the difﬁculties with preference aggregation.
2
5E.g., providing a negative loss function across states of nature for the social planner.
36Regardless, these authors ubiquitously observe that uncertainty about time preference has large
consequences for optimal policy choice.
2
6 Moreso, in fact, than uncertainty about climate sensi-
tivity and damages. It therefore behooves us to seriously consider how to aggregate over uncertain
preferences in the most reasonable way.
In this analysis social welfare is speciﬁed as an average of utility measured in each state of
nature by Equation (A.1), rescaled. The rescaling serves to equate the marginal social welfare
of one additional dollar of current consumption in all states of nature. While arbitrary, some
adjustment is necessary to prevent the resulting policy prescription from being sensitive to the
choice of units in the model.
2
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That is, a policy corresponding to an extra dollar of consumption in the initial period is assumed
to have the same utility gain in every state relative to a no policy (
;) baseline.
This social welfare function has its origins in the literature on social choice. Harsanyi (1977)
shows that in deﬁning social welfare over lotteries, if individual preferences satisfy the von Neu-
mann Morgenstern axioms then social welfare must have this weighted average form. Otherwise,
social preferences will fail to mimic individual preferences over lotteries involving only that indi-
vidual. This functionalformcanalsobederivedfromtheassumptionofcardinalunitcomparibility,
as discussed by Roberts (1980). More ﬂexible forms require additional assumptions about level or
scale comparibility. Our choice of welfare functions is therefore less arbitrary than it might have
originally appeared: a more ﬂexible form requires both integrating out uncertainty from the rep-
resentative agent’s perspective (to satisfy Harsanyi’s point) and more stringent assumptions about
2
6See discussion in Arrow, Cline, Maler, Munasinghe, and Stiglitz(1996).
2
7An explanation of this pointis given in Appendix C of Pizer (1997).




Estimates of uncertainty in the model come from two sources: econometricanalysis and subjective
assessment. The model involves nineteen different parameters. Six are parameters describing
observable economic activity:
















A joint distribution for these parameters is estimated with historical data. The remaining thirteen
describe emissions:












￿ CO2 decay rate
￿
m,








control costs and damages:



















Uncertainty about these parameters is based on subjective analysis.




8Additional levels of comparability are especially difﬁcult with the the constant coefﬁcient of relative aversion
(CRRA)form in Equation (A.1) where the parameter
￿
?
1. Under these assumptions, utilityis alternatively bounded
from above or below.
2
9See Chapter II of Pizer (1996).
38Series describing aggregate investment, capital services, output and prices are ﬁt to the model
described by Equations (A.2),(A.3) and (A.5). The posterior parameter distribution which arises
from this analysis is summarized in Table B.1.
Nordhaus (1994b)
3
0 develops a distribution for the remaining parameters based on a two-step
subjective analysis. The ﬁrst step involves testing his model’s sensitivity to each parameter being
changed, one at a time, to a more extreme value. Those parameters which produce the largest
variance in model output are then further scrutinized. A discrete, ﬁve-value distribution is devel-
oped for seven of these thirteen variables. The other six are ﬁxed at their best guess values. The
distribution of the seven uncertain parameters is summarized in Table B.2. Values of the six ﬁxed
parameters as well as initial conditions for the model are given in Table B.3.
C Factors Which Complicate the Weitzman Analysis
In this section the factors which complicate Weitzman’s (1974) original analysis are discussed.
While these factors do not affect the basic intuition behind his result – that a ﬂatter marginal ben-
eﬁt curve favors taxes – they do qualify it. In particular, the intersection of the expected marginal
beneﬁt and expected marginal cost curve can no longer be used to determine the optimal tax policy
when there are non-linear marginal costs and non-additiveshocks. As noted by Weitzman and oth-
ers (Stavins 1996), correlation also changes the optimality result, with positive correlation among
costs and beneﬁts favoring permits and negative correlation favoring taxes. Other factors such as
truncation and discounting further complicate the simple graphical analysis in Section 3.
C.1 Non-linearities and Non-additiveShocks
A simple graphical comparison of expected marginal beneﬁts and expected marginal costs allows
one to quickly derive the optimal quantity control. This works because these marginal measures
are with respect to the quantity measure and expectations are taken holding the quantity ﬁxed.
3
0Chapters 6 and 7.
39Table B.1: Marginal distributions of uncertain economic parameters
(narrow bars indicate values used in simulationswithoutuncertainty)
description symbol equation distribution
pure rate of time preference
￿ (A.1)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
.
coefﬁcient of risk aversion
￿ (A.1)
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.
rate of capital depreciation
￿
k (A.3)
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.
40Table B.2: Discrete distributions of uncertain climate/trend parameters
(narrow bars indicate values used in simulationswithoutuncertainty)
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41Table B.3: Description of ﬁxed parameters
a




decay rate of atmospheric CO2
￿
m (A.12) 0.00833

































initial rate of CO2 emissions
￿
0 (A.11) billion tons CO2 per
$1989 trillions 0.385
per unit of output
1995 global capital stock
K
0 (A.2),(A.3) $1989 trillions 79.5
1995 global output
Y


















aAll ﬁxed parameters are from Nordhaus (1994b). The parameters that do not depend on time are from Nordhaus’
Table 2.4. Initial values for temperature, CO2 concentrations, and output in 1995, as well as the initial annual growth
rate for population,are based on the Nordhaus base case simulation. The 1995 capital stock is adjusted upward to reﬂect
differences in the deﬁnition of capital as well as underlying parameter values. The decay rate of atmospheric CO2 is
divided by ten to convert from a decennial to annual rate. The annual thermal capacity of the ocean and atmosphere are
from the second line of Nordhaus’ Table 3.4b.
bTemperatures are measured as deviations from the pre-industrializationlevel, circa 1900.
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change in emission level per dollar of tax (GtC/$ at tax = $5)



















￿tax, holding the tax level ﬁxed, and ﬁnding the tax level where these two marginal
measures are equal. This is not generally revealed by a simple diagram such as Figure 5. It is re-
vealed, however, if the slope of the marginal cost schedule is constant and known. In that case, the

















































































This condition, that the slope of the marginal cost curve is constant, will be violated if the
marginal cost curve is non-linear or there are non-additive shocks. Under these conditions, the
43slope of the marginal cost curve cannot be factored outside the expectation, as shown in (C.18). To
verify this condition, the slope of the marginal cost curve can be examined across states of nature
and at different tax levels to see if it remains constant. Figure C.1 shows the distribution of slopes
for a single tax level of $5/tC.
3
1
Given these violations, it will not be possible to determine the optimal tax level from Figure 5
precisely, though it may still provide a rough approximation.
C.2 Truncation
An important point ignored by the Weitzman analysis is whether a particular quantity control is
binding in every state of nature. Figure 6, for example, reveals that a quota of 12 GtC in 2010
would lie above the actual emission level roughly half the time. In these states of the world, it is
inappropriate to count any beneﬁts from the policy since the policy has no consequence. That is,
in order to properly compare the expected marginal cost of a 12 GtC permit policy to its beneﬁts,
marginal beneﬁts should only be counted when the policy is binding.
Figure C.2 shows the consequence of this calculation. The left panel (the same as Figure 4)
shows the distribution of marginal beneﬁts when emissions are ﬁxed at – rather than limited to –
different levels. This calculation ignores the actual level of emissions in 2010. In contrast, the
right panel shows the marginal beneﬁt associated with limiting emissions to the speciﬁed level
(as would occur with a permit system). In those states of nature where uncontrolled emissions are
belowthevalueon the
x-axis, they remainunchanged and thereisno marginalbeneﬁt. Thereforeat
high permit levels (18 GtC) that lie above uncontrolledemission levels in every state, the marginal
beneﬁt is zero. Moving to the right, marginal beneﬁts initially rise as additional states become
contributing beneﬁts. Eventually, the marginal beneﬁt schedule must slope downwards as the
marginal beneﬁt in every state where beneﬁts occur is declining.
3
1From Figure 5 it is clear that the slope also changes at higher permit/tax levels.
44Figure C.2: Distribution of Marginal Beneﬁts in 2010
a
Fixed Emissions Fixed Permits
b















































2010 permit level (GtC, increasing reductions      )
aThese marginal beneﬁts are based on the discounted (to 2010) value associated with emission reductions in the
year 2010 only. Emissions in other periods are held at their uncontrolled levels. Values are expressed in $2010 and,
due to different discount rates across states of nature, will not be weighted equally when balancing costs and beneﬁts.
aThe left panel indicates the range of marginal beneﬁts obtained by varying the level of 2010 emissions as shown,
ignoring the forecast level of uncontrolled emissions. The right panel indicates the range of marginal beneﬁts when
permits are used to control the level of emissions at or below the permit level. That is, in cases where uncontrolled
emissions are below the indicated level, there is no marginal beneﬁt since emissions are not, in fact, being reduced. As
shown in Figure 6, uncontrolled emissions in 2010 are unlikely to be more than 18 GtC. The marginal beneﬁt when
the permit level is set to 18 GtC is therefore zero.
45Figure C.3: Distribution of Discount Factors in 2010
2010 discount factor









Discountingisanimportantissuewhichisignoredinthesimplestaticcase. Even when considering
policy in a single period (2010), it is necessary to wonder whether costs and beneﬁts should be
measured in 2010 or 1995. This is relevant because different states of nature will involve different
discount rates. Speciﬁcally, those states with higher growth involve more discounting relative
to states of nature with low growth. This follows the basic intuition that extra dollars are more
valuable when one is poor than when one is rich.
The static analysis in Section 3 is based on dollar welfare measures in 2010. In contrast, the
dynamic analysis in Section 4 is based on dollar welfare measures in 1995. Surprisingly, there
is little difference in the initial policy outcome, suggesting the descrepancy is small. Figure C.3
shows the range of discount factors observed in 2010 relative to 1995.
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